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In Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co.,' the
Federal Circuit once again felt it necessary to draw distinctions between Title 35 of the United States Code, section 112, paragraph 6
(§ 112, 6) "structural equivalency" 2 and equivalency under the
doctrine of equivalents.3 Observing somewhat petulantly that it
could not tell whether the trial court was attempting to apply
§ 112, 6 or the doctrine of equivalents in arriving at a conclusion
of infringement,4 the Federal Circuit averred that no infringement
5
could be found under proper application of either. It therefore
reversed.'
This dogged insistence that "structural" equivalence differs from
"doctrine of equivalents" equivalence has become a familiar litany
7
in the Federal Circuit literature. Time and time again, the Federal
Circuit has scolded the lower courts for intermingling the two
types of equivalents, pointing to clear differences between the respective analytical frameworks.'
But the Federal Circuit has stopped short of addressing the critical underlying question. That is, accepting arguendo that the
frameworks for analyzing the two types of equivalents are distinct,
what ultimately is the difference between a "structural" equivalent
under the provisions of § 112, 6 and a "doctrine of equivalents"
983 F.2d 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1988). The sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.
Id. It is this final clause which involves concepts of equivalency and gives rise to
the label "structural equivalents."
Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1041-42, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453-54.
Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453-54.
Id. at 1045, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
8 Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
7 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842,
20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Clearly, Atmel and GI/M have
confused equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents with equivalent structure
under section 112, paragraph 6."); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc.,
872 F.2d 978, 989, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("The district
court may have been led into error by applying to the doctrine of equivalents the
more limited scope of the literal infringement provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112 6..
• ."); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236,
239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The word 'equivalent' in § 112 should not be confused, as
it apparently was here, with the 'doctrine of equivalents.' ").
8 See infra notes 23-42.
1
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equivalent?
This Article argues that the Federal Circuit must move beyond
mere admonishments against confusing § 112, $ 6 equivalents and
the doctrine of equivalents. The two unquestionably are different
at some level of abstraction. However, the Federal Circuit must
critically evaluate those differences to determine whether they
truly impact the fundamental underlying equivalency determination. This Article concludes that the Federal Circuit should reinforce the notion that the admittedly distinct analyses under § 112,
6 and the doctrine of equivalents converge as to the critical underlying determination of the meaning of an "equivalent."
I.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR EQUIVALENCY ANALYSIS UNDER

§ 112,
A.

6 AND THE

DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

Section 112, T 6 and the Doctrine of Equivalents in the
Context of the Two-Part Test for Infringement

"The determination of patent infringement is a two-step process":9 The claims are first interpreted,10 and the properly interpreted claims are then applied to the accused device, either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents." Once the claim has
been interpreted, that interpretation is employed whether the application step proceeds under a theory of literal infringement or
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.12 The interpretation step is said to be a question of law,1 3 while the application
step is said to be a question of fact. 4
Given that the Federal Circuit's basis for distinguishing between
"structural" equivalents under § 112, V 6 and equivalents
under
9 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1114, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 185, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d
391, 401, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 705 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
10 That is, the court looks to all relevant evidence to determine the "felt meaning" of the claim. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 702.
1 Id.
at 400, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 704-05.
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870-71, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90,
96 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
" McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 671, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 944, 948
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). The interpretation step almost invariably involves underlying fact issues and so might more properly be denominated a mixed question of law and fact. See Mark D. Janis, Judge and Jury Roles
in Equivalents Analysis: Commentary on Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, 74 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 621 (1992).
14 Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 7 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
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the doctrine of equivalents lies in differences in the respective analytical frameworks, it would seem instructive to compare the two
analyses at the most fundamental level, in the context of the twostep infringement analysis. That is, is the equivalency analysis
under § 112, $ 6 properly characterized as interpretation of a
means-plus-function element, or as application of that claim element to the accused device? Similarly, is the equivalency analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents interpretation or application?
Federal Circuit precedent unfortunately provides little guidance.
As to the doctrine of equivalents, some cases designate the inquiry
as interpretation, 5 while others designate the inquiry as application. 6 By contrast, Federal Circuit cases assume that the § 112,
6 inquiry is interpretation. 7
The characterization is important because specific consequences
flow from it. For example, if the § 112, 6 inquiry really is interpretation, then one might expect the exercise of applying § 112, 1
6 to be denominated a question of law. But the Federal Circuit has
6 equivalents is a
indicated that the determination of § 112,
8 just as the equivalents inquiry under the docquestion of fact,"
9
trine of equivalents is a question of fact.'
In addition, one might expect that if the § 112, 6 exercise is
20
truly interpretation, the exercise would not vary over time. Yet
the Federal Circuit has stated that the determination of
" See Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481,
489 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applying the doctrine of equivalents inquiry is a matter of
claim interpretation).
'a Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir.) ("The doctrine of equivalents, by
definition, involves going beyond any permissible interpretation of the claims language. .. ."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).

Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842-43, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1179-80 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Symbol Technologies, Inc. v.
Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1574, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1356-57, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics,
Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 741-42, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
18 King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 862, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
402, 408 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
19 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 331 (1950).
20 Of course, the patent law does recognize the meaning of a claim term can
change over time and it tolerates the resultant conceptual difficulties. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1247, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
17
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equivalents under § 112, 1 6 is to be made at the time of the infringement: "[i]t is not required that those skilled in the art knew,
at the time the patent application was filed, of the asserted
equivalent means of performing the claimed functions ...," This
presents an interesting wrinkle in the debate over the applicability
of § 112, 16 to ex parte patentability determinations.22 If a § 112,
6 equivalents analysis must be made as part of the patentability
determination, equivalents clearly must be determined as of the
time the invention was made, not as of the time of a future "infringement." One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that
this apparent anomaly justifies-indeed, requires-recognition of
§ 112, 6 equivalents and "doctrine of equivalents" equivalents as
23
"different concepts.

In any event, equivalency under § 112, T 6 and under the doctrine of equivalents is said to be determined at the time of the
infringement. The patent owner is not expected to "predict all future developments which enable the practice of his invention in
substantially the same way." 2 ' At this fundamental level, then,
precedent offers no "bright line" distinction between § 112, T 6
equivalents and doctrine of equivalents equivalents. Until precedent on this point is clarified, the distinction between the types of
equivalents cannot be justified on the notion that one arises from
"interpretation" and the other from "application."

"

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,

1563, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Interestingly, in support of
this proposition, the court cited two doctrine of equivalents cases, Atlas Powder
Co. v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1581, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
409 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 745
F.2d 1, 8, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions
that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 723 (1989) ("The scope of
a functional claim cannot be determined until the claim is applied in an infringement suit, because it is only then that the range of equivalent means will be
determined.").
2 The Federal Circuit recently held that § 112,
6 does in fact apply to ex
parte patentability determinations. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194, 29

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845, 1848-49 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

28 Kenneth R. Adamo, Do the Means Justify the End-A Matter of Bond,
Bowles, the Office and 35 U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph6, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 566, 594 (1992).
24 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362,
219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 473, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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6 and the Doctrine of Equivalents: Analytical
Foundations

6 as setting forth an analysis
Courts have interpreted § 112,
for the literal meaning of a means-plus-function element of a
claim. 25 Thus, § 112, 6 is pertinent to a determination of literal
infringement. By the statute's plain language, a means-plus-function element "covers" the means disclosed in the specification for
20
performing the claimed function and "equivalents" thereof.
27
The Federal Circuit has fashioned a two-step analysis for
§ 112, T 6 determinations under which a means-plus-function element is literally met in an accused device if the device: (1) per2s
forms the identical function claimed for the means element; and
(2) performs that function using the structure disclosed in the
29
specification or an equivalent structure. Both steps are necessary
to the analysis. That is, a finding that some structure in the accused device performs the claimed function cannot, ipso facto, lead
to a finding that the structure in the accused device is "equivalent"
to the disclosed means, for to so hold would read § 112, 6 out of
existence."0
The Federal Circuit has opined that in determining structural
equivalency under § 112, 6, the court is free to use the aids used
"in interpreting any other type of claim language, namely, the
specification, the prosecution history, other claims in the patent,
and expert testimony." 31 As to the use of other claims, however,
the Federal Circuit has cautioned that where application of the
Cases interpreting §112, 6 are thoroughly reviewed in Edward D. Manzo,
"Means" Claims in Patent Infringement Litigation,68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'v 97 (1986) and R. Carl Moy, The Interpretationof Means Expressions During Prosecution, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 245 (1986).
26 See supra note 2.
27 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1114, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 185, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d
391, 401, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 705 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
28 D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236,
239 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
30 Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
31Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842-43, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1179-80 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This follows naturally from the
6 is part of the exercise of
court's assumption that the application of § 112,
interpretation, the first prong of the infringement analysis. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
25
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statute gives a result that would appear to violate the judicially
developed doctrine of claim differentiation, the statute will
control.3 2
To summarize, a § 112, 1 6 equivalence determination requires
comparison between the accused device and the structure disclosed
in the patent specification for performing the identical function
claimed in a means-plus-function claim element.
By contrast, the modern doctrine of equivalents involves the
well-known Graver Tank tripartite test under which infringement
may be found if the claimed and accused devices perform substantially the same overall function, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same overall result.3 3 That is, the doctrine of equivalents inquiry requires comparison between the accused device and the claimed invention, not the disclosed
embodiment
of the claimed invention as in the case under § 112,
34
6.

In distinguishing the two analytical frameworks for equivalence,
the Federal Circuit has emphasized that the § 112, 1 6 equivalence
determination only becomes relevant when identity of function between the accused structure and the claimed function is established. "If the required function is not performed exactly in the
accused device, it must be borne in mind that section 112, paragraph 6 equivalency is not involved. Section 112, paragraph 6 plays
no role in determining whether an equivalent function is performed by the accused device under the doctrine of equivalents. ' ' 35
Presumably, this means that while literal infringement of a claim
containing a means-plus-function element cannot be found when
32 Laitram,

939 F.2d at 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. The court ruled
that "[a] means-plus-function limitation is not made open-ended by the presence
of another claim specifically claiming the disclosed structure which underlies the
means clause or an equivalent of that structure." Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1371. Otherwise, opined the court, one could escape the restriction of § 112, 6
"by merely adding a claim or claims specifically reciting such structure or structures." Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. The doctrine of claim differentiation is
articulated in SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 586-87 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
11 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950) (citing Union Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97
U.S. 120 (1877)).

" See supra part I.B.

" Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 961 (1988) ; see also Manzo, supra note 25, at 109 (noting that the test announced in D.M.I. for § 112,
6 equivalency did not include the word
"substantially").
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the accused structure does not perform the identical function
claimed, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may be
found if the accused structure performs an equivalent function, so
long as the "way" and "result" prongs are also satisfied. That is,
the doctrine of equivalents can be "applied over" the § 112, 6
equivalence analysis.36 Viewed in this light, the § 112, 6 equivalence analysis and the doctrine of equivalents analysis would indeed seem to involve fundamentally different comparisons.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the differences, though significant, are not nearly as great as they might appear. In fact, the
§ 112, 6 type equivalency analysis shares a common ancestry
7
with the doctrine of equivalents. In Winans v. Denmead, the patent claims at issue incorporated by reference the structure disthe then-common phrase
closed in the specification by using
"substantially as herein described."38 In construing the claims, the
Court was faced with the issue of whether to limit the claim to the
precise structure disclosed in the specification as the literal language required. 39 The Court refused to do so, explaining that the
claim would be construed to cover "the precise forms . . .which

embody [the] invention" as well as copies of "the principle or
mode of operation described," even if "totally unlike the original in
form or proportions."40 This principle-that claims could be construed to cover the preferred embodiment described in the specification plus equivalents thereof-came to be known as the doctrine
of equivalents and eventually evolved into the Graver Tank-oriented doctrine invoked today."'
Clearly, then, the concept of comparing accused structure with
structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof, a
6, was not invented by the
concept now embodied in § 112,
4 Rather, it mirrors historical concepts
provision.
drafters of that
of the doctrine of equivalents.43 To be sure, this does not justify
ignoring the modern reality of distinct analytical regimes for
§ 112, 6 equivalents and the doctrine of equivalents. However,
the concept does cast suspicion on the assertion that the two ree.g., Maxim H. Waldbaum & David Sipiora, Pennwalt Redux: Judicial
Uncertainty vs. ProcrusteanBed, 19 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N 237, 243 (1991).
3' 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
3"See,

38
89

Id. at 331.
Id. at 340.

Id. at 342.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42 See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 342.
4. Id.
40

41

1994]

STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCY

213

gimes inevitably produce fundamentally different varieties of
"equivalents." As demonstrated in the following section, analogy
between § 112, 6 and the reverse doctrine of equivalents, 4 ' also
commonly articulated as a justification for distinguishing between
§ 112,
6 and the doctrine of equivalents, befalls a similar fate
when carefully scrutinized.
C.

Section 112,

6 as a Codification of the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents

By the plain language of the § 112, 6, a means-plus-function
clause "does not cover [for infringement purposes, at least] every
means for performing the specified function."' 5 Thus, § 112,
6
permits functional claiming, but "operates to cut back on the types
of means which could literally satisfy the claim language.""' The
doctrine of equivalents, by contrast, is a doctrine of expansion.'
Specifically, according to Judge Rich, application of the doctrine
leaves the claims themselves undisturbed, but "expands the right
to exclude 'equivalents' of what is claimed.""'
The observation that § 112, 6 is a restrictive doctrine has led
courts and commentators alike to analogize § 112,
6 to the reverse doctrine of equivalents.' 9 As put by Professors Adelman and
Francione:
44 For a definition of the reverse doctrine of equivalents, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
45 E.g., Laitram Corp. v. Revnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1536, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The issue of whether § 112, 6 applies in the
context of ex parte patentability determinations is beyond the scope of this
Article.
46 Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1382,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d
931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961 (1988).
47 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
48 Id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
49 Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87.
The reverse
doctrine of equivalents traces back to Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse,
170 U.S. 537 (1898):
[W]here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that
it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way,
but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of
equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for infringement.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 328, 330 (1950) (citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568).
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[Tihe reference to the "equivalents" in section 112, paragraph 6,
should mean that functional elements in combination claims are literally readable if the claim language applies, when it is properly
construed in keeping with the specification and prosecution history,
but the actual infringement is not present when .. .the accused
device has a functionally defined element that functions in a substantially different manner from the corresponding element disclosed in the specification."0
Adelman and Francione go so far as to suggest that a meansplus-function element could be correctly construed to cover all
means for performing the claimed function, and that the reverse
doctrine of equivalents could then be applied to cut back the
51
means-plus-function element in scope where justified.
This approach, while satisfying from a theoretical perspective,
6.11 More importantly,
confounds the plain language of § 112,
6 and the reverse doctrine
however, the analogy between § 112,
of equivalents is superficial because it ignores placement of the
6 equivalence is
burden of proof. The burden of proving § 112,
showinfringement
of
his
borne, of course, by the patentee as part
53
a
"docing. The reverse doctrine of equivalents, by contrast, is
5' ' 4
the proof of which falls to the alleged
trine of non-equivalence,
55
Circuit's reluctance to rely upon the
Federal
the
Given
infringer.
complexities inherent in proving
the
given
reverse doctrine, and
equivalence whatever the analytical regime, the allocation of the
burden of proof as to equivalence may be outcome determinative.
While there is no denying that the restrictive principle embodied
in § 112, 6 mimics that of the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the
analogy ends there. The analogy lends little, if any, support to the
6 equivalency should be distinguished
proposition that § 112,
50 Adelman & Francione, supra note 21, at 725.
11 Id. As Adelman and Francione have acknowledged, the Federal Circuit has
rejected this approach. Id. n.223.
5" See supra note 2.
53 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
14 Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369,
1371, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1889 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
55 Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1325, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The accused infringer must "prove
that its different method ... was a method step 'so far changed in principle ...
that it performs the same or similar function in a substantially different way.'"
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 872 F.2d 407, 409, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950)).
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from equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents.
D. Policies Underlying § 112, 6 Equivalency and
Equivalency Under the Doctrine
The equivalency analysis under § 112, 6 is obviously grounded
in statute." The doctrine of equivalents is a doctrine "judicially
devised to do equity, '57 whose essence is to prevent one from practicing "a fraud on a patent."5' 8 As Judge Learned Hand explained,
courts resort to the doctrine of equivalents "to temper unsparing
logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the
59
invention."
The equivalency analysis under § 112, 6 is required for analysis of literal infringement of a claim containing a means-plus-function element (assuming that the accused structure is not exactly
the same as the disclosed means). The doctrine of equivalents is
not a required component of every infringement analysis; indeed,
it is said to be the exception, not the rule. It is applied on the
equities in response to the wiles of the "unscrupulous copyist""1 for
whom "[o]utright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare
type of infringement. '"' 2 As a typical equitable doctrine, it is not
the "prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered
in a vacuum";6 3 rather, it operates to avoid "plac[ing] the inventor
at the mercy of verbalism"'
and "subordinating substance to
form,"6 5 the result of which would be "to convert the protection of
66

See supra note 2.

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 473, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit is currently considering
whether the Graver Tank test is itself the application of equity, or whether separate equitable proof should be required. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., No. 93-1088, 1993 WL 502162 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 1993) (order calling for a rehearing). Judge Lourie has set forth his suggestions for the elements of
this separate equitable proof. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co.,
991 F.2d 768, 773-74, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1588, 1592 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J.,
concurring).
58Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
59Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692, 77
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825, 79 U.S.P.Q. 454
(1948).
60 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
57

62

Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.

68 Id.

at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
Id. at 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
65Id., 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 330.
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66
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing."
It therefore might be tempting to conclude (as the Federal Circuit expressly did in Valmont"7 ) that § 112, 6 and the doctrine of
equivalents have "separate purposes." 8 It takes little imagination,
however, to discern a common balance of policies underlying both
§ 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents.
As to the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit has observed that:

On the one hand, claims must be "particular" and "distinct" as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, so that the public has fair notice of what
the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have agreed constitute the metes and bounds of the claimed invention .... On the
other hand, the patentee should not be deprived of the benefits of
his patent by competitors who appropriate the essence of an invention while barely avoiding the literal language of the claims.6 9
Judge Bennett, dissenting in Pennwalt, had previously noted
that
[t]he current case presents, as did Graver Tank and as does any
case involving the doctrine of equivalents, a choice between conflicting policies. On the one hand, there is the historic right of affording
the public fair notice of what the patentee regards as his claimed
invention in order to allow competitors to avoid actions which infringe the patent ....On the other hand ...is the policy of affording the patent owner complete and fair protection of what was
invented. 0
The court seems inclined to vacillate quite dramatically on balancing these policies. 7 ' Judging by its more recent pronouncements, the policy of ensuring fair notice by reasonable claim
68 Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
7 Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
:8 Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
' London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
70 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Bennett, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). Judge Bennett proceeded to remark
that "[t]he resulting tension between the competing policies has been long recognized and the inability to reconcile fully the two views has long been accepted by
the courts." Id., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
71 Cf. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328; London, 946 F.2d
1534, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456; Penwalt, 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1737.
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particularity may have the upper hand today.7"
Precisely this same balancing is embodied in all of § 112, and
especially in § 112, 6. Prior to the enactment of § 112, 1 6, claims
including means-plus-function language were routinely held invalid
for indefiniteness.s Section 112,
6 overruled these decisions.
But the provision does not-by its plain language, in any
event-allow unbridled functional claiming. 7" Rather, § 112, 6 allows patentees to express claims in the shorthand of functional
language while simultaneously requiring that the claim language be
linked to disclosed structure.7 6
Ultimately, then, § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents have
parallel purposes. This is not to suggest, however, that the
equivalency exercise under § 112, T 6 must, like that under the
doctrine of equivalents, involve the application of equity. Indeed, if
the Federal Circuit determines that the Graver Tank test is subject to a separate equitable determination and does not itself represent the application of equity, then similarity between Graver
Tank equivalency and § 112,
6 equivalency will become even
more plain. In any event, the distinction between § 112,
6
equivalency and equivalency under the doctrine cannot be justified
on the basis of some perceived difference in "purpose."

II.

A.

ELEMENTAL EQUIVALENCE UNDER § 112,
OF EQUIVALENTS

T6

AND THE DOCTRINE

Elemental Equivalence as Defined Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents

The doctrine of equivalents applies to an entire claim to determine infringement; section 112, 1 6 equivalents pertain only to a

" London,

946 F.2d at 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458-59.

73 See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12-13, 71

U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175, 179-80 (1946).
" Ronald D. Hantman, Patent Infringement, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 454, 487 (1990) (citing P.J. Federico's commentary found in the 1954 edition of 35 U.S.C.A. at 25 (West)). Federico's views, although they are not technically legislative history, are normally accepted as authoritative. Id. at 486. Other
relevant portions of legislative history are set forth in Hantman, supra.
"' But cf. In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 548, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 530, 534
(C.C.P.A. 1957), overruled by In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
70 See id. at 547, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 533.
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means-plus-function element of a claim." However, in its recent
jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit has articulated a concept of elemental equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents.78 While its
contours are not clear, and will likely never be the subject of "a
formula of general applicability, 7 9 elemental equivalence under
the doctrine of equivalents provides a clear basis for comparison to
§ 112, 1 6 equivalents.
Under the concept of elemental equivalence, the Graver Tank
tripartite test is applied on an element-by-element basis, at least
as to the "way" prong: the "substantially the same way" prong of
this test may be met if an equivalent of a recited limitation has
been substituted in the accused device."0
More recently, one panel of the Federal Circuit demonstrated
adamant allegiance to the concept of elemental equivalence by
promising that
[a]s a matter of terminology under the doctrine of equivalents, we
will speak only of infringement of a claim and of an equivalent to a
limitation .... Specifically, we avoid speaking of "equivalency" between the accused device and the patented invention. To speak of
"equivalency" to the invention creates confusion and is technically
inaccurate ....Equivalency to limitations of the claim must be the
focus of the inquiry ....1
71 This has given rise to such vague statements as: "Under the doctrine of
equivalents, however, each [element or limitation] is viewed in the context of the
entire claim," in contrast to §112, 6 equivalents. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip.
Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
78 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Nies, J., additional views) ("[W]hen
an element is entirely missing, that is, when the accused device does not contain
either the exact element of the claim or its equivalent, there is no infringement.
Conversely, an element is not 'missing' if an equivalent has been substituted."),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). Judge Nies concluded that:
the term 'equivalents' in the 'doctrine of equivalents' refers to
'equivalents' of the elements of the claim, not 'equivalents' of the claimed
invention. While a device found to be an infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is, in a sense, 'equivalent' to the claimed invention, that conclusion follows from application of the doctrine. It is not the equivalency determination to which the doctrine is directed, but the result thereof. To speak
of a device as being an 'equivalent' of the patented invention muddles the
analysis.
Id. at 953, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
19 Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2942 (1992).
80

Id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.

81Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 n.2, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1431 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
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As commentators have noted, despite the furor over the proper
analytical approach to the doctrine of equivalents, little guidance
has been given as to the key underlying question of what is an
"equivalent" to a limitation. 82 The case law, however, yields a variety of formulations.
The Federal Circuit has validated the use of a subsidiary function/way/result analysis directed to claim limitations:
This court has not set out in its precedent a definitive formula for
determining equivalency between a required limitation or combination of limitations and what has allegedly been substituted therefor
in the accused device .... We note that the district court resolved
the question by... a subsidiary analysis comparable to the overall
function/way/result analysis mandated for determining infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents .... The district court's "function/way/result" equivalency analysis appears to be a helpful way to
approach the problem and is entirely in accord with the analysis actually made in Graver Tank .... 0'
However, the Federal Circuit avers that it has "never adopted
the three prong approach to determining equivalency of a limitation."8' 4 In other words, "while comparison of function/way/result
is an acceptable way of showing that structure in an accused device is the 'substantial equivalent' of a claim limitation, it is not
the only way to do so ....
Perhaps most prominent among the various formulations for elemental equivalency is the "interchangeability" criterion. "An important factor [in defining an equivalent] is whether persons
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that
was," 86 giving full "consideration ... to the purpose for which an
ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined
with other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to
perform."8 7 The interchangeability criterion applies even when
82 See Adelman & Francione, supra note 21, at 678-79 ("In many respects, the
choice of an element-by-element or entirety approach has little consequence for a
fact-finder seeking guidance in answering the real question at issue: What is an
'equivalent'?").
83 Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962, 1968-69 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
84 Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
88 Id. at 1326, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (emphasis added).
8 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 331 (1950).
" Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 331.
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only future technological developments unanticipated by the patent owner impart or enable the interchangeability. That is, "variations in the invention, made possible by subsequent advances in
the art, do not allow the accused infringing device to escape the
'web of infringement.' ",88 Foreseeable interchangeability, of course,
will typically constitute strong evidence of equivalence. 9
Although the interchangeability criterion is important, at least
one recent Federal Circuit case suggests that interchangeability is
not the sine que non of elemental equivalency. "An interchangeable device is not necessarily an equivalent device," 90 where, for example, the asserted range of equivalency, notwithstanding
interchangeability, would encompass the prior art.
Other formulations that do not appear to be analytically distinct
from the "interchangeability" criterion also appear in the Federal
Circuit's opinions. For example, the Federal Circuit may find
equivalency on the basis of an "insubstantial change" or an "inmay base
substantial substitution."9 Likewise, the Federal 'Circuit
92
equivalency upon finding a "minor modification.
Interestingly, the court has also hinted that equivalence may
arise when structure in an accused device is but an obvious variation of claimed structure,93 extending the patent law axiom: "that
which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier
88 American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol Lab. Inc., 745 F.2d 1, 9, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1365, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Bendix
Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1382, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617, 631 (Ct. Cl.
1979)); accord Marsh-McBirney, Inc. v. Montedoro-Whitney Corp., 882 F.2d 498,
504, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1794, 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC,
Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 326, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 838, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1985), later proceeding, 879 F.2d 820, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
89 Harry Roper, Proving Patent Infringement at Trial, PATENT LITIG. (forthcoming 1991), reprinted in 1991 WL 320 PLI/Pat 369.
90 Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1806, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91See, e.g., Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528,
1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("insubstantial change");
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1579, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("insubstantial substitution").
92 Carman Indus., Inc, v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 488
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
93 Judge Nies has observed that "[s]ome [infringements] may be infringements
under the doctrine of equivalents which, if one wished to draw a parallel, is somewhat akin to obviousness." Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744,
748, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766, 1768 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007
(1988).
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than the date of invention."94 However, for a claim A B C, and an
accused product A B C', the court has also held that C' may be
equivalent to C even if C' is an unobvious improvement over C. 96
The important inquiry is whether adding C' to the combination
gives unexpected results, as this may indicate whether the "substantially the same result" prong is met.96
Plainly, then, if precedent reveals that courts are relying upon a
subsidiary Graver Tank function/way/result analysis, or other
common equivalency formulations developed under the doctrine of
equivalents, to determine equivalent means under § 112, 6, it
would be difficult to rationalize the distinction between the § 112,
T 6 equivalents and equivalents under the doctrine at the level of
elemental equivalence.
B. Elemental Equivalence as Applied to § 112, 1 6
Equivalents
The Federal Circuit has stated explicitly that a modified Graver
Tank tripartite test is applicable to § 112,
6 equivalence
determinations:
Whether the issue is equivalency of a means that is described in the
specification to perform a function in a "means" clause of a combination claim (i.e., literal infringement), or equivalency to the
claimed invention as a whole (i.e., infringement by the doctrine of
equivalents), the test is the same three-part test of history: does the
asserted equivalent perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to accomplish substantially the same result.
(In the case of "means" clauses, of course, the function is that stated
in the claim.)9"
On a prior occasion, the Federal Circuit observed that
[a]though, as we pointed out in [D.M.I.], there is a difference between a doctrine-of-equivalents analysis and a literal infringement
analysis involving "equivalents" under § 112, Graver Tank concepts
" Roy H. Wepner, The Patent Invalidity/Infringement Parallel:Symmetry or
Semantics, 93 DICK. L. REV. 67, 73 (1988).
" Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor
Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1240, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1923 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 853 (1989); Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1426-27, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
96 Atlas, 750 F.2d at 1580 n.3, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 417 n.3.
97 Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1571, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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of equivalents are relevant in any "equivalents" determination. The
fact that Graver Tank preceded the 1952 Patent Act by two years
and the last paragraph of § 112 was new suggests that the underlying principles of equivalents in Graver Tank could be used in a
§ 112 literal infringement analysis.98
6
Moreover, the application of Graver Tank to § 112,
exequivalency determinations predates the Federal Circuit. For
ample, in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States," the Court of
Claims analyzed § 112, 6 equivalents by considering whether the
circuits in the accused device and those exemplified in the patent
functioned "in substantially the same manner to achieve substantially the same result ... ."100 In Hale Fire Pump Co. v. Tokai,
Ltd.,10 1 the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
explicitly relied upon a Graver Tank analysis to determine § 112, 1
6 equivalency.1 " 2 Another illustrative case in point is Stearns v.
Tinker & Rasor,10 3 which clearly uses Graver Tank language in a
6 equivalency analysis.104
§ 112,
Applying to these cases the gloss of Pennwalt and Corning
Glass, one derives the rule that a subsidiary function/way/result
analysis-or, rather, a subsidiary way/result analysis, since function must be identical-should be applicable to determining § 112,
T 6 equivalents. The Federal Circuit's rejection of this approach
recently in Valmont is disturbing.10 5
More importantly, however, the "interchangeability" criterion
has been expressly accepted by the Federal Circuit as a "useful
consideration" in the context of § 112, 6 equivalents.1 06 Even in
Valmont, the court applies the "insubstantial change" considera9s Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 975 n.4, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 8 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Curiously, the court went on to note that the
doctrine of equivalents "is distinct and can be different from" § 112, T 6
equivalents because the latter arose in the context of a literal infringement determination. Id. n.4, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 n.4.
99 553 F.2d 69, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
100 Id. at 79, 193 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 458.
101614 F.2d 1278, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
102Id. at 1283, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 126-27. The Federal Circuit has accepted
C.C.P.A. precedent as binding. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 137071, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657, 657-58 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
103 252 F.2d 589, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 222 (9th Cir. 1957).
104 Id. at 599-600, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 229-31.
105 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1124, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1915, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Graver Tank in support of its use of interchangeability); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 82, 193
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449, 461 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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tion to both the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6 equivalence
analyses. 0 7 The two types of equivalents are indistinguishable at
this level of abstraction.
Furthermore, the concept of elemental equivalency also exposes
weaknesses in another apparent analytical distinction between
§ 112,
6 and the doctrine of equivalents. It is well established
that the doctrine of equivalents is limited in that infringement
cannot be found when the asserted scope of equivalency would encompass the prior art. 10 8 The doctrine is also limited in that it will
not allow the patent owner to recapture through equivalence that
which was given up during prosecution. 0 9 On the other hand, the
Federal Circuit has held that § 112, 6 equivalents are not limited
by the prior art because § 112, 6 pertains to discrete claim limitations which "may, and often do, read on the prior art .... ",, On
this basis, the Federal Circuit posited a distinction between § 112,
6 equivalents and doctrine of equivalents equivalents:
In Texas Instruments this court suggested, in dicta, that there
might be some similarities between the equivalence analysis under
section 112, paragraph 6, and the application of the doctrine of
equivalents .... That case did not suggest, however, that the prior
art should be considered in determining literal satisfaction of a
means-plus-function claim limitation.'
However, the observation that § 112, 6 equivalents are elemental, and thus not limited by the prior art, should logically apply
equally to elemental equivalence under the doctrine. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has stated that an elemental equivalent under the
doctrine of equivalents is not necessarily limited by the prior art,
because "[n]othing is taken from the 'public domain' when the is"' Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
108 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 68384, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir.) (advocating the use of a "hypothetical claim" analysis to make this determination), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992
(1990).
109 Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870-71, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
90, 96 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
110 Intel v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union
Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 865, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); cf.
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1570, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
561, 572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that § 112 equivalents are limited by statements in the prosecution history). The precedential value of this holding has been
questioned. See Moy, supra note 25, at 265.
I Intel, 946 F.2d at 843, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (citation omitted).
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sue of equivalency is directed to a limitation only, in contrast to
the entirety of the claimed invention."1 1' 2 Thus, the apparent dis6
tinction articulated in Intel breaks down when § 112,
equivalents and doctrine of equivalents equivalents are compared
at the elemental level.
Prior to the Federal Circuit's adoption of the elemental approach to the doctrine of equivalents in Pennwalt, Edward Manzo
observed that:
If the tests for a Section 112 equivalent and a doctrine of
equivalents equivalent each follow the Graver Tank guidelines, it is
by the
difficult to rationalize the need for the distinction announced
113
Federal Circuit [in D.M.I.] between these "equivalents.
Plainly, the observation is even more true now that the Federal
Circuit has articulated the concept of elemental equivalence under
the doctrine of equivalents.
III.

VALMONT AND THE INTERSECTION OF § 112,
AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

6

EQUIVALENTS

The Federal Circuit recently had the opportunity to clarify its
6 and the
precedent regarding the intersection between § 112,
4 While recognizing that "Section 112 and
doctrine of equivalents."
the doctrine of equivalents have something in common," 11 5 in that
both invoke the familiar concept of insubstantial change, the court
nonetheless perpetuated many of the arguments it relied upon in
6
previous cases to justify the distinction between § 112,
1 6 Indeed, the court
equivalents and the doctrine of equivalents.
arguably went further by expressly rejecting the Graver Tank tripartite test in the context of § 112, 6.117
A.

The Valmont Case

The patent claims at issue in Valmont related to an apparatus
for irrigating a non-circular area that included including a "control
,,2Corning Glass Work v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962, 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1's

Manzo, supra note 25, at 114.

Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
"6 See id. at 1042-43, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
117Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
114
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means for operating" a moving means.1 1 8 The trial court, in finding
the claims infringed, concluded that the steering mechanisms on
the claimed and accused systems were "equivalent" with regards to
the control means.1 1 9 The trial court had purported to apply the
Graver Tank tripartite test as follows:
The Court concludes that the means for steering in the two systems
are equivalent-that is they are substantially the same functionthere's a control means for operating the moving means ....120
Writing for a panel of the Federal Circuit, Circuit Judge Rader
first observed that "[a]pparently the district court applied some
form of equivalency analysis to find infringement." '2 1 This
equivalency analysis might have been "either the equivalency
anal1 22
ysis of 35 U.S.C. § 112 . . .or the doctrine of equivalents.
The court then compared the two analyses, concluding that:
An equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents results from an insubstantial change which, from the perspective of one of ordinary
skill in the art, adds nothing of significance to the claimed invention
.... In the context of section 112, however, an equivalent results
from an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to
the structure,
material, or acts disclosed in the patent
12
specification. The court justified this distinction on familiar grounds. It relied
upon the "separate origins" of § 112,
6 and the doctrine of
equivalents, 124 it likened § 112,
6 to the reverse doctrine of
equivalents,1 25 and it cited the separate "purposes" of § 112, 6
and the doctrine. 26 Yet the origins of the § 112, $ 6 equivalency
concept and the doctrine of equivalents are intertwined, 2 7 the
analogy to the reverse doctrine of equivalents is strained,128 and
§ 112,
6 and doctrine of equivalents ultimately have identical
purposes. 29 This timeworn panoply of arguments simply provides
18
11

120
121

Id. at 1040, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
Id. at 1041, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.

Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
Id. at 1043-44, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
Id. at 1042, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
Id. at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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121
124
121
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6
no satisfactory foundation for a distinction between § 112,
equivalents and doctrine of equivalents equivalents.
The court did acknowledge that both equivalency determinations involve the notion of "insubstantial change,"130 but then proceeded to undercut this correct statement by refusing to accept the
use of Graver Tank principles under § 112, 16: "A determination
of section 112 equivalence does not involve the equitable tripartite
test of the doctrine of equivalents.'' 131
It is true that the Graver Tank tripartite test does not apply per
6, given the
se in equivalency determinations under § 112,
court's holding that the § 112, 6 analysis calls for identity of
function while the Graver Tank test calls for mere substantial similarity.'32 It might also be said that the § 112, 6 analysis refers to
the function of the means-plus-function element alone, while the
tripartite test refers to the overall function performed by the device, although when a subsidiary tripartite test is applied to determine equivalency of a limitation, it is difficult to see any
distinction between the two "functions."' 33
The court's statement, then, may be correct in the sense that the
"function" prong is inapplicable to § 112, 6 equivalency determinations without ruling out the possibility that the "way" and "result" prongs of Graver Tank are applicable to such
determinations. If this is what the court meant to say, the court's
apparent outright rejection of the use of the Graver Tank test is
tremendously misleading and is almost certain to cause confusion,
particularly given that most equivalency determinations center
130

Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.

131

Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.

132 D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236,
6
239 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Adamo, supra note 23, at 594 (the § 112,
equivalent "is one of identity of function, not 'substantial' identity, which is the
hallmark of the doctrine of equivalents"). But the Federal Circuit has already
recognized this in Texas Instruments. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
'33 Judge Nies has attempted to draw this distinction, curiously enough, in the
context of defending the element-by-element approach to the doctrine of
equivalents:
Part of the misreading of Hughes is apparently due to the double "function" inquiry-one being the overall function [work] of the device; the other
the function of the means-plus-function element. The "function" in the
function/way/result test of Graver Tank is not the "function" of a single
means element. The latter is part of the inquiry into whether the accused
device works in the "same way."
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 954, n.3, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1755 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Nies, J., additional views), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
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about the "way" prong. TM Most courts and litigators will read the
statement for what it says on its face-that no portion of the
Graver Tank test can be used for § 112, 6 determinations. Moreover, the court's statement simply fails to account for precedent.
The great weight of precedent from the Federal Circuit and its
predecessor courts explicitly establishes that Graver Tank concepts are relevant to § 112, T 6 equivalency. 13 5 With no citation
to-let alone explanation of-this contrary precedent, the Valmont court endorsed the premise from D.M.I. that § 112,
6
equivalents and the doctrine of equivalents are not to be "confused." 13 6 Unfortunately, this is but another example of the Federal Circuit speaking "with at least a slightly forked tongue"1"7 on
the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, M
6.
B.

Analysis and Recommendation

There is simply no sound justification for refusing to apply
Graver Tank principles to the § 112, T 6 equivalency determination. In future cases, the Federal Circuit should make clear that
the "substantially the same way" prong is applicable to § 112, 6
equivalency. Structure in an accused device that performs exactly
the claimed function and works in substantially the same way as
the disclosed means should be found to be a § 112, $ 6 equivalent
138
to that means.
This formulation is useful because it eliminates the artificial distinction between § 112,
6 "structural" equivalents and
equivalents under the doctrine. Moreover, the formulation is particularly appropriate given the Federal Circuit's use of the subsidiary "substantially the same way" prong in determining elemental
131 "[Tihe relevant inquiry, as it is in nearly all doctrine of equivalents analyses, is whether the accused device and the claimed invention perform the same
overall function to achieve the same overall result in substantially the same
way." Id. at 940 n.3, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 n.3. (Bennett, J., dissenting);
see also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
"I See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
.36 D.M.I., 755 F.2d at 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at
239.
137

ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLIcY

715 (1992).

The patentee should also be compelled to explain why the accused structure
and the disclosed means are substantially the same in way in accordance with
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, especially in the jury trial setting. See Janis,
138

supra note 13, at 649.
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equivalence.13 9
Finally, this formulation expressly allows courts to avail themselves of the concepts of "insubstantial change," "interchangeability," and even "obvious variation," all of which are brought in
under the umbrella of the "way" prong. Even the Valmont court
relied upon these concepts. The court could simplify matters by
expressly reaffirming precedent validating the use of Graver Tank
concepts for § 112, 6 equivalency. Differences in the respective
6 equivalents and the doctrine of
analytical regimes for § 112,
equivalents do not support distinct concepts of § 112, T 6
"equivalents" and doctrine of equivalents equivalents. Until the
Federal Circuit makes clear that § 112, T 6 equivalents and
equivalents under the doctrine both rely upon Graver Tank principles of substantial sameness of "way," district courts will continue
to struggle with the supposedly distinct concepts of equivalents.

18

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.

